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Abstract
This Essay completes a scholarly cycle in which I have defended free trade and international
economic cooperation against charges that globalization will harm the environment and drain jobs
from the high-wage economies of western Europe, Japan, and the United States. The demolition
of geographic and social barriers since the end of the Cold War has delivered not only material
wealth but also physical tranquility, political stability, and personal freedom to vast portions of
the world’s population. The path to peace lies today, as it did in 1938, not in a retreat to obsolete
notions of local sovereignty, but in a commitment to lawmaking on a global scale.
PAX MERCATORIA:
GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE
AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME"
Jim Chen*
I. CRUZANDO FRONTERAS REALES Y METAFORICAS1
Europe, no less than any other part of the earth, has known
"rivers ancient as the world and older than the flow / of human
blood in human veins." 2 In September 2000, as I traveled from
the meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics
in Ghent to a teaching visit at the Slovak Agricultural University,
I had occasion to cross several of Europe's most historic rivers.
Mindful of the lyrical power and metaphorical significance of
watery boundaries,' I took pains to note the rivers as I crossed
them.
One day I awoke in Cologne, on the western bank of the
Rhine. Roman Colonia, closer in space and in spirit to
Charlemagne's Aachen than Bismarck's Berlin, represented the
Empire's concession that its legions could penetrate neither the
Rhine nor the Danube.4 Modern Kdln is the largest city in the
modern German Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen but not its capi-
tal, a distinction that belongs to Dfisseldorf on the Rhine's Teu-
tonic bank. From Cologne I drove the length of reunited Ger-
* Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, 2000-2001, University of
Minnesota Law School <chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu>; Visiting Professor, Slovenski
Pol'nohospoddrska Univerzita v Nitre, Fakulta Ekonomiky a Manaimentu. Anna Ban-
dlerovd, Peter Fandel, and Eleon6ra MarigovA showed me every kindness during my stay
in Slovakia. Raj Bhala, Francesca Bignami, Donald A. Dripps, Gil Grantmore, Drew L.
Kershen, and David McGowan provided helpful comments. Nicole Saharsky provided
very capable research assistance. My fiancee, Kathleen Howard, extended her love and
support as I sought to buttress the international dimension in my scholarship. I dedi-
cate this Essay to her.
1. See generally Margaret E. Montoya, Border Crossings in an Age of Border Patrols:
Cruzando Fronteras Metaf6ricas, 26 N.M. L. REv. 1 (1996).
2. Langston Hughes, The Negro Speaks of Rivers, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANG-
STON HUGHES 23 (Arnold Rampersand & David Roessel eds., Vintage Books 1994).
3. WALKER PERCY, THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE: How QUEER MAN Is, How QUEER
LANGUAGE IS, AND WHAT ONE HAS TO Do WITH THE OTHER 83, 89-90 (1975); cf WILLA
CATHER, MY ANTONIA 6 (Houghton Mifflin 1995) (1918) ("[B]y that time I had crossed
so many rivers that I was dull to them.").
4. See 1 Hugh Trevor Roper, Introduction to EDwARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Alfred A. Knopf 1900).
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many into the Linder of Thuringen and Sachsen, past the cities
of Erfurt and Weimar, never stopping at what was once one of
the world's bitterest borders. The city of Dresden, roughly half-
way between Berlin and Prague and squarely on the axis on
which Eastern Europe's popular uprisings spun in 1989,5 was
preparing to commemorate the tenth anniversary of German
reunification. I crossed the Elbe and turned south toward the
Czech Republic.
After completing a few chores at the border-presenting
my passport, acquiring a Czech superhighway sticker, buying lo-
cal currency-I took stock of my journey. I had already negoti-
ated both the Rhine and the Elbe, completing between sunrise
and sundown a feat that no liberating army accomplished during
the Second World War. In symbolic terms, my trip embraced
not mere decades, but centuries. My day had begun in Westpha-
lia and would soon end near the site of the Second Defenestra-
tion of Prague. Better still, I had also reversed the Thirty Years'
War in a metaphysical sense. In a day filled with border cross-
ings, the notion of the nation-state-the bedrock principle of
international law since 1648 6 -had played a trivial role.7 As I fell
asleep near the banks of the Vltava, I realized that the world's
collective "soul has grown deep like the rivers."8
In the recent memory of Eastern Europe's rivers, from the
Vltava to the Vistula and the Volga, September is the cruelest
month. Of their own force, the events of September 1, 1939,
would merit this distinction. But amid the calm of September
2000, I recalled an even earlier September. On September 30,
1938, eleven months and one day before the outbreak of World
5. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION, at xii-xiv (1999) (describing those uprisings as the birth pangs of the
contemporary, globalized world); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBER-
SPACE 3 (1999) (describing the death of communism from exhaustion and "the begin-
nings of a new political society").
6. The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, is widely
regarded as the basis for the notion of the nation-state and the contemporary law of
nations. See, e.g., HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 188 (1944); Daniel Philpott,
Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief Histoiy, 48J. INT'L APP. 353, 364 (1995). See generally
C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1938).
7. See generally JAN-MARIE GU9HENNO, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (Victoria
Elliott trans., 1995); ROBERTJ. HOLTON, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE (1998);
John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 903 (1996).
8. Hughes, supra note 2, at 23.
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War II, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany brokered the
Mfinchner Diktat, the agreement that enabled Germany to an-
nex Sudetenland and eventually the rest of the Czech lands.
The Second Thirty Years' War entered its final, traumatic spasm
where its seventeenth-century counterpart had begun.'
Nearly sixty-two years later, the darkest cloud in Europe
again hung over the Czech lands. This time, though, the threat
stemmed not from Munich-where Oktoberfest had just be-
gun-but from Prague itself. A coalition of antiglobalization ac-
tivists, hoping to duplicate their success at the December 1999
meeting of the World Trade Organization1" ("WTO") in Seattle,
gathered in Prague to disrupt the September 2000 meeting of
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and World Bank.
Some symbolic events, like the color purple, are simply so
striking that we ignore them at our peril. 1 From Seattle in De-
cember 199912 to Prague in September.2000, a trail of well-or-
ganized protesters taunted the WTO, the IMF, and the World
Bank as the unholy trinity of globalization.1" The most civil
voices of this increasingly powerful movement argue that global-
ization portends "disast[er]" for "American democracy-to say
nothing of social justice throughout the world."14 As in 1938,
global opinion has divided starkly on the proper formula for
"peace for our time.""
The antiglobalization movement, to put it bluntly, is wrong.
Even modest sensitivity to human welfare over time and across
contemporary space exposes the remarkable nature of the an-
tiglobalization protests in Prague. In the heart of a country and
9. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE GATHERING STORM,
at xiii (1948) (describing World Wars I and II as the "Second Thirty Years' War").
10. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
11. Cf ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE 191 (Harcourt, Inc. 1982) ("I think it
pisses God off if you walk by the color purple in a field and don't notice.").
12. Gerard Baker, Starbucks Wars, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at 10 (describing the
Seattle protests as "America's first post-modern riot").
13. In recognition of Hillary Rodham Clinton's election to the United States Sen-
ate, I shall refrain, at least in text, from describing the antiglobalization movement as a
"vast left-wing conspiracy."
14. Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 589, 590 (2000).
15. Neville Chamberlain, Peace for Our Time, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF TWENTIETH-
CENTURY SPEECHES 168, 169 (Brian MacArthur ed., Penguin Books 1992).
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a region that paid dearly when an isolationist West chose "to go
home and sleep quietly in [its] beds, '"16 a group of self-appointed
activists quite seriously tried to portray the rules and institutions
of international economic relations as the greatest contempo-
rary threat to human welfare and security. But multinational
corporations do not belong in the same category as Adolf Hitler.
Nor do the core institutions of international economic law, re-
gardless of the extent to which they have facilitated the rise of
the global economy, deserve the opprobrium that has hounded
Neville Chamberlain since the failure of appeasement. A cir-
cumspect world, in the interest of peace, progress, and prosper-
ity, should reject the normative 'claims of the antiglobalization
movement.
This Essay completes a scholarly cycle in which I have de-
fended free trade and international economic cooperation
against charges that globalization will harm the environment17
and drain jobs from the high-wage economies of western Eu-
rope, Japan, and the United States. i" The demolition of geo-
graphic and social barriers since the end of the Cold War has
delivered not only material wealth but also physical tranquility,
political stability, and personal freedom to vast portions of the
world's population. The path to peace lies today, as it did in
1938, not in a retreat to obsolete notions of local sovereignty,
but in a commitment to lawmaking on a global scale.
II. PEACE FOR OUR TIME
Before proceeding further, I hasten to add that I ascribe no
real legal or intellectual significance to one traveler's casual ob-
servations. Travelogue as academic critique is probably one of
the more treacherous forms of scholarship by anecdote.19 I also
have a confession to make. In earlier scholarship, I suggested
that questions of legitimacy, especially constitutional legitimacy,
16. Id.
17. SeeJim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (2000).
18. See Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1 (2001).
19. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807
(1993); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards ofDimitri Yurasov: Further
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647 (1994).
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should take priority over economic questions of efficiency and
equity in trade law.20 No less than environmental protection or
any other enterprise under positive law, legal scholarship is a
learning experience. 21 By the time of the antiglobalization riots
of 1999 and 2000, I had come to appreciate that economic effi-
ciency, political legitimacy, and social justice are inextricably in-
tertwined in a world without frontiers. 22 Once again I must re-
cite the law professor's rueful refrain: "Write today, regret to-
morrow, renounce maftana"
23
The globalization debate is no casual matter, however, and
if I would do it justice, my penance must give way to passion.
The "technologically driven expansion of ... markets well be-
yond the limits of even the largest national territories and the
replacement of markets and hierarchies by relational net-
works"2 4 triggered "a broad process of restructuring state and
civil society. ' 25 "Economic globalization stands as an upheaval in
the relief map of the political economy on an order comparable
to the abolition of slavery and serfdom, or to the Industrial
Revolution with its impacts on urbanization and the division of
labor. 2z6 "The key political arguments of the next few years...
will all be variations arising from one underlying conflict: the
20. See Jim Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Ar-
bitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1455, 1457 (1992) (declining to "dispute the benefits of free trade or of international
arbitration" and stating "a belief that economic and political benefits ... should not
color constitutional analysis").
21. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 791 (1994).
22. See generally Jim Chen, Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without Frontiers, 18
CAReozo L. REv. 1031 (1996).
23. Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony's Deregulatory Shootout, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1580 (1999).
24. Stephen J. Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization, in GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZA-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS 146, 163 (John H. Dunning ed., 1997); see alsoJohn
H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 24-25
(1996) ("[Given] the difficulty of government regulation of international economic be-
havior ... there is today hardly any subject that can be said to be effectively controlled
by a single national sovereign."); cf David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1375 (1996) ("The rise of an electronic
medium that disregards geographic boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating
entirely new phenomena . . . that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current
territorially based sovereign.").
25. IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION 6 (1997).
26. Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of
Nikes and Microsofts, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 249, 251 (2000).
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one between globalizers who want to see the world reshaped in
their own image and traditionalists who want to preserve frag-
ments of traditional culture and local independence. ' 27 The di-
chotomy defines disputes over trade, political autonomy and sov-
ereignty, cultural identity, and environmental protection.
Globalization's enemies have enjoyed amazing success in
framing the debate. An anarchically inclined branch of the pro-
test movement has established a dominant narrative of American
popular culture run amok,2  genetically engineered food, 29 and
Third World sweatshops.3 0 A parallel narrative stressing autarky
targets free trade, developmental lending, and cooperation
among central banks-the very raisons ditre of the WTO, the
World Bank, and the IMF.3 These intergovernmental bodies, so
the complaint goes, advance the interests of multinational cor-
porations at the expense of rights too precious to be left to the
vagaries of the marketplace. 2 The triumph of the new economy
27. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, A FUTURE PERFECT: THE CHAL-
LENGE AND HIDDEN PROMISE OF GLOBALIZATION, at xvi (2000).
28. See, e.g., WALTER LAFEBER, MICHAEL JORDAN AND THE NEW GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(1999); THE BEAVER BITES BACK? AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE IN CANADA (David H.
Flaherty & Frank E. Manning eds., 1993); RosemaryJ. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies:
Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1365-
1366 (1996); Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade,
National Identity, and Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203,
207 (1998); CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, Mars Bars and Marlboros: Cultural Aspects of
Foreign Investment in Russia, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 505 (1997); David
R. McMahon, Walter LaFeber, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 641 (2000) (book review); Andrew M. Carlson, Note, The Country Music
Television Dispute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism
and American Entertainment Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585 (1997); Amy E. Leh-
mann, Note, The Canadian Cultural Exemption Clause and the Fight to Maintain an Identity,
23 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COMMERCE 187 (1997); Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas,
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Paul Raeburn, Clamor over Genetically Modified Foods Comes to the United
States, 8 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 610 (2000); Jeffrey K. Francer, Note, Frankenstein Foods or
Flavor Savers?: Regulating Ag7icultural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union,
7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257 (2000).
30. See, e.g., Claudia R. Brewster, Restoring Childhood: Saving the World's Children from
Toiling in Textile Sweatshops, 16J.L. & COM. 191 (1997); Maria Gillen, Note, The Apparel
Industry Partnership's Free Labor Association: A Solution to the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or
the Emperor's New Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1059 (2000).
31. See Chen, supra note 18, at 23 (describing the argument against globalization
as proceeding along two lines, anarchy and autarky).
32. Cf Lasch-Quinn, supra note 14, at 593 (demanding "profound deliberation of'
and a sharp distinction between "what properly belongs in the market-and what does
not").
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over the welfare state has allegedly spurred nations to undertake
a ruinously competitive race to the bottom. Labor standards, en-
vironmental protection, and cultural identity allegedly hang in
the balance. The protest movement denounces globalization as
imperialist insofar as it projects the moral values of the United
States and the military interests of the north Atlantic alliance.
To be sure, the localists have the easier task. Their strategy
is appallingly simple and, from a globalist perspective, simply ap-
palling. Wave the twin banners of "sovereignty" and "auton-
omy,"33 recount a few anecdotes about corporate excesses,34 ac-
cuse all opponents of "neocolonialism,"35 and presto! Globaliza-
tion becomes public enemy number one. Domestic support for
free trade nevertheless remains strong. Americans view the
WTO favorably by a two-to-one margin, and three-fifths of union-
ized American workers favor continued WTO membership. 6
(The latter figure is huge in light of American unions' tenacious
resistance to free trade.) 37 So wide a gap between rhetoric and
reality suggests that the legal agenda has been substantially and
harmfully distorted.
The conventional case for trade rides on "essentially only
one argument. That argument, almost entirely economic in
33. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of Domestic Political Con-
stituencies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 248 (1999) (describing the WTO as "at best a
partial, and at worst a fraudulent, judicial system" because it does not "rest on a basis of
complex legislation derived from competing social inputs"); Patti Goldman, The Democ-
ratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 643-47
(1994); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 COR-
NELL Irr'L L.J. 699, 705-10 (1994); cf Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Insti-
tutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1944, 1948
(1997) ("The loss of sovereignty does not trouble me, but the loss of democracy is
another matter."). See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World
Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
775, 793-94 (1999) (reviewing the relevant legal literature).
34. See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
527 (1994).
35. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-
Brave) New World Order of Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11
(1998).
36. See Mike Moore, Reflections on the Global Trading System (Aug. 25, 2000), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/spmm35-e.htm (recounting the speech
by the Director-General of the WTO at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, and citing surveys by
the Angus Reid group and the Association of Women in International Trade).
37. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Influential Myth of a Generalized Conflict of Inter-
ests Between Labor and Management, 81 GEO. L.J. 39, 83 (1992).
38. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 692 (11th ed. 1980).
2232000]
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tone, is nevertheless "exceedingly powerful": "Free trade pro-
motes a mutually profitable division of labor, greatly enhances
the potential real national product of all nations, and makes pos-
sible higher standards of living all over the globe. '"39 The eco-
nomic defense of trade is a variation of the general truism that
competition allocates goods and services more efficiently than
any other economic condition.4 ° Even after nearly two centuries
of refinement, the theory of comparative advantage still retains
its power.4 This is the sense in which "David Ricardo was the
true winner of the Cold War."4 2
Despite its power, the conventional argument for free trade
has failed to persuade its staunchest critics. The antiglobaliza-
tion arguments made at and since Seattle evidently enjoy some
sort of rhetorical advantage. Perhaps the problem stems from
the widely held jurisprudential view that civil liberties are not
only distinct from but also superior to their economic counter-
parts.43
A rhetorical rescue of globalization therefore lies in some
sort of substantially noneconomic set of arguments. I propose to
capture the essence of those arguments in a single phrase: pax
mercatoria. I quite deliberately intend to blend the spirit of lex
mercatoria4 4 with the legacy of pax britannica and pax americana.
Since medieval times the law merchant has facilitated commer-
cial transactions that might otherwise be frustrated by deep cul-
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
36-39 (1979).
41. See generally PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 15-39 (4th ed. 199 1)
(surveying the "new trade economics" and other refinements on the theory of compara-
tive advantage); Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passi?, 1 J. EcON. PERSP. 131 (1987)
(surveying models of trade that downplay the traditional rationale of comparative ad-
vantage).
42. Chen, supra note 17, at 190; cf PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 686 (15th ed. 1995) ("[T]he theory of comparative advantage is one of the
deepest truths in all of economics.").
43. See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 257-58 (2000); Ron-
ald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 15 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
But cf Louis A. Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Principles of Fairness Versus Human Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that human welfare should be the sole
touchstone of legal analysis and that notions of fairness should receive no independent
weight).
44. See, e.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MER-
CATORIA (1999); LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW 'LAW
MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1997).
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tural, linguistic, and political barriers.45 In the public sphere,
pax mercatoria represents the peace dividend that develops when
free trade makes nations too busy and too rich to fight.4 6 No less
than war,47 peace has its own implicit jurisprudence. Laws fos-
tering globalization, free trade, economic development, and in-
ternational economic cooperation provide the jurisprudential
infrastructure for peace.
Alas, a proposition as broad as pax mercatoria eludes easy
proof. "Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they
are easily overlooked."48 As Bill Clinton told an admiring crowd
in Hanoi, globalization "is the economic equivalent of a force of
nature" that Vietnam and other developing nations must learn
to harness "like wind or. water."49 Globalization thus represents,
to borrow a phrase from the elder George Bush, a "new world
order. '50 The ,balance of this Essay will marshal evidence from
diverse corners in support of the pax mercatoria hypothesis. First,
the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank were consciously de-
signed to keep the peace and remain quite effective in this role.
Second, the experience of the United States, the nation that has
most aggressively promoted globalization, demonstrates that ec-
onomic integration affirmatively enhances political well-being
across the board, but most of all for the historically downtrod-
den. Finally, globalization promises to stabilize the least devel-
oped countries and countries undergoing the transition from
central planning to capitalism.
45. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WEST-
ERN LEGAL TRADITION 333-56 (1983); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 657-70 (5th ed. 1956); cf Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2
Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEo. LJ. 1141 (1985) (describing Llewellyn's effort to incorporate
the law merchant into twentieth century commercial law).
46. See Chen, supra note 17, at 169; Chen, supra note 18, at 60.
47. See generally David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 299 (2000).
48. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
49. David E. Sanger, Huge Crowd in Hanoi for Clinton, Who Speaks of "Shared Suffer-
ing," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at Al (quoting President Clinton).
50. President Bush evidently uttered this phrase in public for the first time at an
August 30, 1990, news conference on the Persian Gulf crisis, see Confrontation in the
Gulf: Excerpts from the President's News Conference On Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1990,
at All, and repeated it in his 1991 State of the Union address. See generally William
Safire, The New, New World Order, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, § 6, at 14.
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III. PAX MERCATORIA
A. The Legacy of Bretton Woods
War, needless to say, retards trade.5 Although the converse
proposition-that trade retards war-may be less obvious, it hap-
pens to be the strongest noneconomic argument for free trade.
Amid the devastation of World War II, this argument was disposi-
tive. The rules and institutions that govern international eco-
nomic relations today grew out of a belated understanding that
peace cannot flourish in a world burdened by trade barriers.
The October 1929 collapse of American stock markets destroyed
the twin "cornerstone [s] of German prosperity: loans from
abroad, principally from America, and world trade."52 By "sign-
ing..., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act into law in June 1930," Her-
bert Hoover committed the "most disastrous single mistake any
U.S. president [ever] made in international relations."53 Retalia-
tory tariffs helped transform a trade war into actual military con-
flict;54 the destruction of trade accelerated a deflationary spiral
that had begun with major powers' collective retreat to the gold
standard.55 The ensuing "major world depression" energized
"the nationalists in Japanese politics and paved the way for the
electoral victory of the Nazis in Germany in 1932. "56
When at last military victory seemed within reach, the allies
convened at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 7 to lay the eco-
51. See Jim Chen, Filburns Forgotten Footnote-Of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate,
82 MINN. L. REV. 249, 286 (1997).
52. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 192 (1959).
53. Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy and Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 291, 291 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987).
54. Cf Glenn W. Harrison et al., Costs of Agricultural Trade Wars, in
MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 330 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et
al. eds., 1989) (providing a game-theoretic model of retaliatory tariffs). See generally
PHILIP FRIEDMAN, THE IMPACT OF TRADE DESTRUCTION ON NATIONAL INCOMES (1974).
55. Compare PETER TEMIN, LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION: THE LIONEL ROB-
BINS LECTURES FOR 1989, at 42 (1991) (blaming interwar reliance on the gold standard
for the catastrophic deflation of the late 1920s and early 1930s), with id. at 80-81
(describing the destruction of world trade as aggravating rather than causing a defla-
tionary cycle more properly attributed to bad monetary policy).
56. Cooper, supra note 53, at 291. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 38-41 (1969).
57. To be precise, from July 1 to July 22, 1944, at the Mount Washington Hotel.
See Mount Washington Hotel and Resort, at http://www.mtwashington.com/hotel/
monetary.html.
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nomic foundation for postwar peace. 58 The three institutions
born of that summit-the IMF, the World Bank, and the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade59 (or "GATT"), forerunner
of the WTO-received an unequivocal mandate to keep the
peace.6 °
By and large, the Bretton Woods institutions have suc-
ceeded. Until NATO forces bombed Yugoslavia in 1999,61
Thomas Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Avoid-
ance" accurately described international relations after World
War II: no two nations with a McDonald's restaurant waged war
against each other.6 2 Although the global economy would later
destroy one of Bretton Woods' most ambitious achievements-
the system of fixed exchange rates for the world's leading cur-
rencies6-this peace dividend remains one of the strongest ar-
guments in favor of free trade.64
To be sure, a causal link between trade and peace eludes
easy empirical verification. Nevertheless, the Golden Arches hy-
pothesis rests on a sound theoretical foundation. At the simplest
level, interaction across borders enhances cross-cultural under-
standing and reduces xenophobia.65 Trade's social and eco-
nomic effects compound over time. Groups with a stake in the
58. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLU-
TiON IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982); Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton
Woods Agreement-25 Years Later, 29 STAN. L. REv. 235 (1971); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Is
There Law After Bretton Woods?, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 380 (1983) (reviewing DAM, supra).
59. Under the treaty concluding the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks,
the WTO assumed all responsibilities theretofore exercised by GATT. See WTO Agree-
ment. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, The GAT T-WFO System at Fifty, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J.
421 (1998).
1 60. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. [hereinafter GATT]; Articles of Agreement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, July 22, 1994, entered into force Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. No. 1501,
2 U.N.T.S. 39; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2
U.N.T.S. 134.
61. See Thomas Friedman, Was Kosovo World War III?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1999, at
A17.
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 195-98.
63. At least within Europe, this is an idea whose time may have come again.
64. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States
with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539,
552 (1993).
65. Quite remarkably, the contemporary American left readily accepts "diversity"
as a defense of race-based university admissions but evidently rejects an analogous argu-
ment in the realm of international relations.
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peaceable maintenance of open borders and open markets gain
leverage over their parochial counterparts. Wealth decreases the
taste for war,66 just as wealth increases the taste for environmen-
tal amenities. 67 Finally, trade appears to be a one-way ratchet:
once a country commits itself to the economic specialization im-
plicit in the theory of comparative advantage, reverting to au-
tarky and closed markets becomes prohibitively expensive.
GATT and the WTO are not the sole heirs of the legacy of
Bretton Woods. Monetary stability and infrastructural recon-
struction, the domains of the IMF and the World Bank, have
made no small contribution to peace. Hyperinflation wrecked
the German middle class during the 1920s and corroded the
bourgeois virtue that ordinarily insulates civil society from ex-
tremist politics. 68 Insurance against a recurrence of that episode
is chief among the benefits from "international monetary coop-
eration, exchange stability,.., orderly exchange arrangements,"
and "temporary financial assistance to countries" experiencing
an adverse "balance of payments" adjustment. 69 At the core of
this stabilizing mission are crisis-defusing "multibillion-dollar res-
cue packages," cobbled together before "isolated economic woes
in a few countries . . .gr[olw into a global financial crisis."70
Although the extent to which the IMF has "foster[ed] economic
growth and high levels of employment" is debatable, 71 Weimar-
style hyperinflation has in fact all but disappeared from the de-
veloped world.
As for direct foreign aid, the tool by which the World Bank
pledges to attain "a world free of poverty, "72 we need look no
further than the opposite of Smoot-Hawley. The Marshall Plan
was America's most important and most successful foreign aid
66. Cf MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE
69 (1990) ("[C]ruelty is a universal source of enjoyment for people who have not devel-
oped more sophisticated skills.").
67. See, e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN D. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF A
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (1991); PETER HUBER, HARD GREEN 151
(2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT:
CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-6, 22-24 (1992).
68. See generally D.N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177 (1994).
69. See International Monetary Fund, at http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm
[hereinafter IMF Profile].
70. Michael M. Phillips, IMF Acts to Contain an Investor Exodus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
2000, at A21.
71. IME Profile, supra note 69.
72. See The World Bank Group, at http://www.worldbank.org.
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program. Through both world wars and the Cold War, "the
United States has consistently shown it is willing to expend its
wealth, and even its citizens' lives, to bring peace to Europe.
73
The difference in developmental trajectories between the coun-
tries that accepted American aid and those that did not-invaria-
bly under Soviet pressure to refuse-almost defies belief. The
countries of western Europe went on to establish prosperous, sta-
ble democracies. Until the end of the Cold War, their counter-
parts did not.74
Such obvious lessons of history would not bear repeating if
they were not so shamefully ignored by today's isolationists. The
American right has historically bemoaned almost all foreign aid,
conveniently forgetting that the Marshall Plan and its counter-
parts fostered capitalism and liberal democracy, more or less on
the American model, through much of the postwar world. For
its part, the left-of-center critique of American-style globalization
overlooks the crucial contribution of trade and direct aid in re-
building western Europe after 1945.
Even after the successive crises of World War II and the
Cold War, the Bretton Woods institutions continue to foster the
legal conditions that promote orderly development-and deter
war. Everything we really needed to know about globalization,
we learned at Bretton Woods. This is especially true of the free
trade rules that GATT and the WTO have enforced since 1947.
Two remarkably simple principles in the original text of GATT
laid a secure foundation for international trade law. First, the
"most favoured nation" principle of Article I requires GATT
members to treat other members no worse than any other state.
Second, the "national treatment" principle of Article III requires
GATT members to subject domestic producers to the same tax
and regulatory burdens as those imposed on foreign producers.
At its core, GATT prescribed two golden rules: Do unto others
as you do unto others (Article I) and do unto others as you do
unto yourself (Article III). Enhanced by the more sophisticated
notions that tariffs are the least objectionable of trade barriers
and that the community of nations can agree to negotiate tariffs
73. Bill Cash, European Integration: Dangers for the United States, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
315, 315 (2000).
74. See generally MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST
AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS (2000).
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downward over time,75 GATT's golden rules formed the kernel
of a trade-based charter for world law.76 Though the 1947 treaty
was provisional by design, the decision to adopt the original
rules forty-seven years later as the basis for the World Trade Or-
ganization confirmed that the original GATT was indeed "a cove-
nant running from [that] generation of [citizens] to us and then
to future generations, 77 a charter designed to palliate protec-
tionist passions across the ages.78
B. Globalization U.S.A.
It is no accident that the words to this paean on interna-
tional economic law are drawn directly from the American con-
stitutional tradition. All expressions of public law are intrinsi-
cally hopeful enterprises premised on the optimistic expectation
"that rational individuals can design and agree to political and
social institutions that channel and constrain individual self-in-
terest to the betterment of all."' 79 And the public law of the
United States, in its broadest jurisdictional manifestation, befits
a process of globalization justifiably described as being of
America, for America, and by America." °
American constitutional law's strong commitment to free-
dom of movement for goods and for persons advances personal
liberty and political stability. Of the many permutations on fed-
eralism, the "oldest question of [American] constitutional law,"'"
free trade among the states, may be the most important. The
free trade guarantees implicit in the commerce clause, 2 the
75. See GATT art. II.
76. See generally Harold J. Berman, The Role of International Law in the Twenty First
Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1617 (1995).
77. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
78. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) ("[A] Constitu-
tion [is] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.").
79. DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACy 48 (1996).
80. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 308 ("With the end of the Cold War, globaliza-
tion is globalizing Anglo-American-style capitalism .... It is globalizing American cul-
ture and cultural icons. It is globalizing the best of America and the worst of
America.").
81. NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992); accord H.Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633 (1993); see also United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[F]ederalism was the
unique contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory.").
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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privileges and immunities clause,8" and the import-export and
export clauses,84 are perhaps the oldest and most important of
American industrial policies. The dormant commerce clause in
particular guarantees an American "common market" premised
on the "economic interdependence of the States."85 It ensures
that interpersonal and commercial transactions within the
United States remain "free from all invidious and partial re-
straints."86 "The free trade regime established by the Constitu-
tion reduces the influence of protectionist groups.... thus pro-
moting both economic growth and accountable government."87
The Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurispru-
dence establishes a judicially managed, domestic equivalent of
international trade law.88 The states of the American union
must presumptively grant the domestic equivalent of "most fa-
vored nation" status and the national treatment privilege to their
sister states. America's constituent states "must sink or swim to-
gether," for "in the long run [their] prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division."8' 9 . Unlike member-states of the WTO,
however, American states may not unilaterally retaliate when ag-
grieved by a violation of the United States' internal free trade
83. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
84. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws ...."); United States v.
United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998); United States v. International Bus.
Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996)
85. E.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994) (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting); accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977). See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the
Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORy L.J. 1227
(1995).
86. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571
(1997); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824).
87. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARv. L. REv. 511, 538 (2000).
88. See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401, 1401-1402
(1994).
89. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). See generally Daniel A.
Farber, Pleading a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignties and the New Federalism, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (2000).
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norms. Instead, they must rely either on constitutional litigation
or congressional relief.9 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed a willingness to limit the states' role in international eco-
nomic relations insofar as it acknowledges that "the President's
maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for
the benefits of access to the entire national economy without ex-
ception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by [the states'] incon-
sistent political tactics."91
In the early American republic, economic crisis supplied
the impetus for political union. Under the Articles of Confeder-
ation, the newly independent states freely abused property rights
and pursued inflationary policies.92 The states also repeatedly
denied Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce and to replenish the depleted Treasury through du-
ties on imports.93 The 1787 Constitution's vastly stronger com-
mitment to federalism reflected the framers' determination to
reinforce political union through economic integration.94
American history has vindicated James Madison's belief that the
commerce clause was principally "a negative and preventive pro-
vision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than
... a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General
Government."95  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., undoubtedly
agreed: "I do not think the United States would come to an end
if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
90. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 & n.18 (1982); A&P Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379-81 (1976).
91. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298-2299 (2000).
92. See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION 155-57 (1985).
93. See id. at 169-71.
94. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 226 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing Shay's Rebellion of 1786-1787
and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 as threats to the United States under the Articles of
Confederation and the newly adopted Constitution of 1787); Duncan v. Kahanamoka,
327 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1946) (same). See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); Marc Egnal & Jo-
seph Ernst, An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 3
(1972); Allison Olson, The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolu-
tion, 69 J. AM. HIST. 21 (1982); Joseph Reid, Jr., Economic Burden: Spark to the American
Revolution?, 38J. ECON. HIST. 81 (1978).
95. James Madison, Letter to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 3 MAX FAR-
RAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911); accord West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994).
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declaration as to the laws of the several States."96 E pluribus
unum and hallelujah.97
The economic and political integration of the states has ad-
vanced the civil rights of Americans. If indeed the framers of the
Constitution "split the atom of sovereignty,"" an invaluable re-
lief valve for political energy lies with maintaining the power of
central authorities to check local abuses.9 9 During the early days
of the United States, the few women and slaves entitled to vote
supported a strong union among the states because economic
and political integration gives rise to complex social structures
and liberates groups who would otherwise remain disempowered
in simpler, more traditional settings.1"' The American polity
that was most explicitly born of devotion to localism mercifully
"[dlied of [that] [t]heoyy."''1
In our time, the implied freedom to trade across state lines
has spawned an extensive jurisprudence on the constitutional
right to travel. 102 Commitment to personal freedom of move-
ment has become an essential element of civil rights in
America. 10 3 By contrast, ferocious hatred of upward devolution
96. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291,
295-96 (1920).
97. Chen, supra note 51, at 262.
98. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); accord Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999).
99. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the federalism envisioned in the original Constitu-
tion gave "our citizens . . . two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57
(1995) (declaring the democratic interest in preserving the United States' "dual system
of government" so as not to "obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (arguing that a "healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front"); cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157 (1992) (stating that the task of confining Congress to its enumerated powers
"would be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to
anyone").
100. See Rosmarie Zagarri, Gender and the First Party System, in FEDERALISTS RECON-
SIDERED 118, 131-34 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1999).
101. 3 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: RED RIVER TO APPoMATFox
766 (1974) (quoting Jefferson Davis).
102. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
472 U.S. 612 (1985); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941); cf Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1957) (articulating an
interest in the right to travel abroad).
103. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). But cf United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
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of political power characterizes not only the antiglobalization
crusade but also America's militia movement.10 4 Once we realize
that the extreme left and the extreme right are both willing to
resort to violence, the antiglobalization protests at Seattle and
Prague can no longer masquerade as paragons of populist virtue.
They differ from the 1995 bombing of federal offices in
Oklahoma City in intensity, mayhem, and political polarity, but
not in kind.
Freedom to travel also has an environmental dimension.
Aggressive environmental protection safeguards the freedom of
movement by severing decisions to travel or to move from varia-
tions in environmental quality.' 0 5 The same Commerce Clause
that protects trade among the states enables Congress to address
environmental problems that affect multiple states or otherwise
impair the movement of goods and persons in interstate com-
merce. This connection becomes all the more critical in an era
of unprecedented constitutional pressure on federal environ-
mental law.' 6 Civil liberties of the first order wither when the
ordinary citizen "must be afraid to drink freely from his [or her]
country's rivers and streams."'1 7 In this sense, official complicity
in environmental degradation violates the international human
(2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act for want of a substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce).
104. See CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE LONG AFFAIR: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1785-1800, at 304, 309-10 (1996).
105. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570,
596 (1996); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State,
1997 U. CHI. L.F. 199; cf A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 252 (1997) (describing amendments to the
Safe Drinking Water Act as an "exercise in congressional protection of the implied right
to travel").
106. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (invali-
dating the Corps of Engineer's assertion of jurisdiction over intrastate waters based
solely on the presence of migratory birds); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.
2000) (questioning the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act as applied to
restrict habitat destruction and other activities that harm red wolves in Virginia), cert.
denied, No. 00-844 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2001); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 195 F.3d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 and 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000); National
Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524
U.S. 937 (1998); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); Virginia v.
Browner, 80 F.3d 859 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997).
107. EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS 185 (1971);
accord Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 279, 305 (1998).
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rights norm against "arbitrary ... exile."' 8
"[A] cross-the-board globalism" °9 is the best way of coordi-
nating free trade and environmental protection as "complemen-
tary" policies.110 Admittedly, simultaneously advocating free
trade and environmental integrity typically earns a deluxe suite
at the "very small hotel" that will be hosting the next "global con-
vention of rabid free trade environmentalists." '' Yet this jarring
juxtaposition is unavoidable in a world of falling frontiers. The
creation of "transboundary communities" causes "environmental
interconnection" and in turn the "inevitabl [e]" abandonment of
"localism in all spheres."'1 2 Strictly localist solutions will not suf-
fice; "haphazard local encouragement" cannot replace coordi-
nated responses to "diffuse, cross-jurisdictional" problems such
as mobile source emissions and nonpoint-source runoff."3
Environmental integrity as a human right, so central in the
localist critique of globalization, is more effectively advanced by
free trade than by protectionism. In the absence of clearly de-
fined, consistently enforced trade rules, "environmental stan-
dards" rapidly become "especially attractive candidates for dis-
guised protectionism.""' 4 Standards as vague as multifunctional-
108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess. 7, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948); see also Arthur C. Helton, Forced International Migration:
A Need for New Approaches by the International Community, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1623
(1995).
109. Chen, supra note 17, at 192; see also Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins:
The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. Rrv. 1247, 1273 n.192 (1996)
(observing that most "[f] ree trade advocates" and "[e] nvironmentalists" unwittingly "ac-
cept [globalist] arguments in one sphere," whether economic or environmental, "that
they regard as illegitimate in the other").
110. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1992) ("[I]ncreasing world welfare can
lead to citizen demands and governmental actions to improve protection for the envi-
ronment.").
111. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REv.
1283, 1284 (1997).
112. Farber, supra note 109, at 1271.
113. Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of Com-
munity-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REv. 1371, 1409 (1998).
114. C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The New
NontariffBarriers, 11 Nw.J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 47, 47 (1990); see also DANIEL C. Esrv, GREEN-
ING THE GATT 45 (1994); Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to
Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2164-2165 (1995); Alan 0. Sykes, Regu-
latory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1999); cf
Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: Differ-
ent Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 540 (1998) (describing food safety
law as another fertile source of protectionist regulation); Frieder Roessler, Domestic Pol-
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ity or sustainability are "far more susceptible to political capture"
than specific and transparent environmental measures.115 Per-
haps no controversy depicts this dynamic as vividly as the transat-
lantic tussle over beef from hormone-fed cattle.1 16 One attrac-
tive alternative to parochial, intrinsically protectionist measures
lies in the adoption of uniform global standards.1 7 That pro-
ject, however, presumes a continued commitment to integration
rather than isolation in matters affecting the global economy
and the global environment.
C. World Party
John Rawls's difference principle poses one 'final obstacle.
Pax mercatoria is legitimate only if it advances the welfare of soci-
ety's least advantaged class.' 18 Free trade may promote freedom
and environmental quality in a country justly described as "the
Michael Jordan of geopolitics," 9 but what does it *promise be-
yond the shores of the United States? Far from undermining the
legitimacy of pax mercatoria, a look at the developing world and
at formerly Communist countries confirms the metaphysical
icy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON.
L. 513, 514 (1998) (observing that regulatory burdens on foreign competitors are rou-
tinely rationalized as being in the public interest).
115. Pamela Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1063 (1999).
116. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Dale E. McNiel,
The First Case Under the WFO's Sanitary and Phytosanitaly Agreement: The European Union's
Hormone Ban, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 89 (1998); Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under
the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preferences in the Growth Hormones Controversy,
6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625 (1997).
117. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environ-
ment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 700, 703 (1992); MarkJ. Spaulding, Trans-
formation of Environmental Regulation and Public Parties in the Resolution of International
Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1142 (1995). But cf Henry N.
Butler &Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The CaseforReallocat-
ing Environmental Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25 (1996) (arguing that the jurisdic-
tion affected by environmental damage, and not the jurisdiction most able to harmo-
nize standards, should be empowered to establish environmental standards).
118. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 6 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 60 (1971). See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Interpersonal Distrust in the Modified
Rawlsian Society, 48 SMU L. REV. 217 (1994) (assessing the difference principle); Daniel
J. Gifford, The Relevance of the Complexity of Social Arrangements to the Attainment of Rawlsian
Justice, 51 TUL. L. REv. 510, 527-46 (1977).
119. Thomas L. Friedman, Medal of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at A29.
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benefits of international economic coordination for nations rich
and poor.
Although the exact relationship between political freedom
and economic growth remains ambiguous, 120 certain constants
have emerged since Bretton Woods. Chief among these is the
recognition that neither wealth nor liberty can flourish unless
private parties can realistically expect that courts will decide
cases according to reasoned law and free of interference from
the political branches of government. Rule of law, taken for
granted in the United States and its peer nations, remains the
sine qua non for development.
121
Perhaps no element of rule of law is as critical as an inde-
pendent judiciary. 122 Corrupt or politically captive judiciaries
impair development. 23  The kleptocracies that have arisen in
the former Soviet Union demonstrate all too clearly how corrup-
tion in judicial administration and law enforcement can stunt
growth and freedom.' 24 By contrast, the restoration of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 has not drained the wealth
from the former Crown Colony. The difference lies in the Chi-
nese government's respect for the independence of Hong
Kong's judiciary, however fitfully and grudgingly China honors
that pledge. 25
120. See Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic
Growth, 7J. ECON. PERsp. 51 (1993) (documenting ambiguous empirical evidence of the
link between political freedom and economic growth).
121. See Viet D. Dinh, Wat Is the Law in Law & Development, 3 GREEN BAG 19
(1999).
122. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87, 96-97 (1999); Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries
Poor: The Role of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF DEVELOPMENT 40 (Edward Buscaglia et. al, 1997).
123. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
173 (1999).
124. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Tran-
sition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (assigning blame for the stag-
nant Russian economy to the flowering of rights to exclude, many of them corruptly
acquired, after the fall of the Soviet Union); John M. Litwack, Legality and Market Reform
in Soviet-Type Economies, 5 J. ECON. PERSp. 77 (1991). See generally THE ECONOMICS OF
CORRUPTION AND ILLEGAL MARKETS (Gianluca Fiorentini & Stefano Zamagni eds., 1999);
Helmut Sohmen, Critical Importance of Controlling Corruption, 33 INT'L LAW. 863 (1999).
125. See, e.g., Albert Chen, The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong, 33 INT'L LAW.
1025 (1999); Lin Feng, The Constitutional Crisis in Hong Kong-Is It Over?, 9 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'v 281 (2000); Owen Fiss, Hong Kong Democracy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 493
(1998); Ted Hagelin, Reflections on the Economic Future of Hong Kong, 30 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 701 (1997).
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On balance, increases in wealth do enhance human
rights. 126 Economically vibrant societies tend to adopt and main-
tain beneficent laws and legal institutions.' 27 Cheaper, easier
communication empowers the heretofore oppressed and dispos-
sessed. 1 8 Through these channels globalization achieves its in-
direct but positive impact on political freedom.1 2 9  "Globaliza-
tion is not only the creation of world markets and transnational
companies; it also means the extension ofjustice and democratic
values into regions where barbarism still flourishes." 0
Much work nevertheless remains. Because human beings
must secure their physiological needs before they can debate ab-
stract notions of liberty,13 1 many politicians and intellectuals in
the developing world "espouse the priority of economic and so-
cial rights over civil and political rights.' 2 For example, Lee
Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore best known
as the leading proponent of "Asian values," has argued that
"freedom, human rights and democracy do not add up to much"
for those who "are hungry [and] .. .lack basic services."1 3 Sub-
Saharan Africa is another region where "pressing economic and
126. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Martin Weale, On Measuring the Quality of Life, 20
WORLD DEV. 119 (1992); T.R. Gurr, On the Political Consequence of Scarcity and Economic
Decline, 29 INT'L STUD. Q. 51 (1985); R.D. McKinlay & A.S. Cohan, A Comparative Analy-
sis of the Political and Economic Performance of Militay and Civilian Regimes, 8 COMP. POL. 1
(1975); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of
Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988).
127. See Thomas G. Moore, An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom, 77J. POL.
ECON. 532 (1969); cf Milton Friedman, The Relation Between Economic Freedom and Politi-
cal Freedom, in THE LIBERTARIAN READER: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS FROM
LAo-Tzu TO MILTON FRIEDMAN 292 (David Boaz ed., 1997) (arguing that economic free-
dom fosters broad social norms that in turn promote political freedom).
128. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1237
(1999); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
129. A.T. KEARNEY, INC., GLOBAL BUSINESS POLICY COUNCIL, GLOBALIZATION LEDGER
9-10, at http://www.atkearney.com [hereinafter KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER].
130. Mario Vargas Llosa, Crossing the Moral Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2001, § 4,
at 17.
131. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 35-46 (2d ed. 1970);
cf Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 110, 114 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 1972) (arguing that human civilization, as distinct from threadbare survival,
begins with production of means to satisfy the need for physical sustenance). See gener-
ally BRUCE E. MOON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (1991).
132. Adamantia Pollis, Liberal, Socialist, and Third World Perspectives of Human Rights,
in TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 1, 20 (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds.,
1982).
133. Philip Shenon, Singapore, the Tiger Whose Teeth Are Not Universally Scorned, N.Y.
TIMES, April 10, 1994, at A5 (quoting Prime Minister Lee).
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social development needs" allegedly privilege "economic-based
rights over civil and political freedoms.""'34
But pitting civil liberties against economic development is a
false dichotomy. Economic development, after all, is also a
human right."l 5 Reconciling democracy with development fits
squarely within the established legal framework for assessing and
securing human rights. A sounder view of the developmental
dynamic treats wealth as a precondition for rights, not a compet-
itor or a substitute. 1
36
Even clear economic successes, however, do not directly ad-
vance human rights. Economic progress in developing countries
can "foment ethnic envy and hatred" toward an economically
dominant but politically disadvantaged minority. 137 Regrettably,
much of the world still regards human rights at best as a luxury
item and at worst as a badge of Western imperialism.1 3 8 Global-
ization has not yet realized its "potential to neutralize inequities
134. Ronald St. J. MacDonald, Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the
United States Constitution Abroad, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 195 (1992) (book review).
135. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.157/24, adopted at Vienna, June 14-25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993);
cf Convention on Biological Diversity art. 20(4), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (declaring the
"eradication of poverty" to be a paramount developmental objective under the Conven-
tion). See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
136. See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals (unpublished manuscript). "The Trou-
bles" in Ireland provide tangential support for this proposition. Irish patriot Michael
Collins believed wholeheartedly that Ireland would know no peace until it enjoyed eco-
nomic prosperity independent of Britain's. See TIM PAT COOGAN, MICHAEL COLLINS:
THE MAN WHO MADE IRELAND 422-23 (1996). The current peace process in Northern
Ireland began with the emergence of Ireland as the "Celtic Tiger:" "The question of
Protestant or Catholic is giving way to new ones: Visa or MasterCard,? Cash or Charge?
Expanding markets and lines of credit breed good will toward men.... And Ireland's
lively new economy-the Celtic Tiger purring in the Republic-trumps the old
begrudgers and hateful rhetoric." Thomas Lynch, A Hero of Celtic Renaissance, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at A29. On the other side of the Atlantic, residents of the world's
largest island understand all too well how economic dependency keeps Greenland
within Denmark's colonial orbit. See James Brooke, Greenland Is Pampered But Ponders
Cutting Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A7 (suggesting that "[i]f there were oil, inde-
pendence would come in about a quarter of an hour").
137. Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law
and Development, 108 YALE LJ. 1, 5-6 (1998).
138. See Frank B. Cross, International Determinants of Human Rights and Welfare: Law,
Wealth or Culture?, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 276 (1997); LisaJ. Bernt, Note,
Measuring Freedom? The UNDP Human Freedom Index, 13 MICH.J. INT'L L. 720 (1992); cf
Raj Bhala, Mrs. WATU and International Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAw. 1, 21 (1999) (ob-
serving that the developing world sometimes regards the environmental imperatives of
the developed world as imperialism in green drag); Bartram S. Brown, Developing Coun-
tries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 347, 376-77 (1994) (same).
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based on gender and race and to make such factors irrelevant in
the calculation of opportunities available for economic advan-
"1139tage.
Globalization advances democracy not only by raising over-
all wealth, but also by improving the political climate within na-
tions. The ability of multinational corporations and skilled
workers to adopt "fight or flight" strategies encourages govern-
ments to adopt transparent policies and to broaden political par-'
ticipation."4 o Businesses and nongovernmental organizations re-
spond by cooperating with the government to form "transna-
tional epistemic communities. '  Even where they are despised
as scourges against local businesses, multinational corporations
introduce moral values in countries that have yet to realize
globalization's full benefits. 4 2 At the opposite end of the ideo-
logical spectrum, even as unstable governments plunge into
kleptocracy and anti-Western terrorists flourish,' 43 nongovern-
mental organizations have stepped into the resulting power vac-
uum in order to help police the morals of globalized society. 144
, Global markets for capital and labor can discipline rogue
governments swiftly and effectively. 4 They do so by carrot and
by stick. First, the carrot: "states keep their promises" because
"they receive payoffs" within the community of nations "when
other states successfully rely on their actions."' 46 Because global
139. Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 181 (1999).
140. Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 943, 944 (1998) (quoting KENT VAN DE GRAAF, HUMAN ANATOMY 399, 429 (2d ed.
1988)).
141. See generally Peter Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Robert T. Kudrle, No Entry: Sectoral Controls on Incoming Direct Invest-
ment in the Developed Countries, in MULTINATIONALS IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
142 (Lorraine Eden & Evan H. Potter eds., 1992).
143. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 267-83 (describing the rise of both Russian
kleptocracy and terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden).
144. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations
and the "Unregulated" Market Place, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 957 (1996); A. Dan Tarlock, The
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental
Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61 (1992).
145. See STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME 39 (1995); cf FRIEDMAN, supra
note 5, at 86-87 (describing a "Golden Straitjacket" of narrow fiscal and monetary
choices imposed on national governments by international capital markets).
146. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1137 (1999).
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markets ostracize states that fail to secure and maintain "civi-
lized" status, national governments still tend to pay "lip service"
to international law in order if only "to avoid the inference that
they are rogue states." '147 Only "serious intent" to comply with
the rules of international monetary cooperation and free trade
can secure "good standing in the international economic com-
munity.""14 The global capital markets measure compliance with
these norms quite precisely through the "interest-rate premium"
that investors "demand for buying developing-country bonds in-
stead of U.S. Treasurys."149 In the long run, compliance with
globalization's underlying legal structure fosters an "across-the-
board, indivisible obligation to heed the rule of law."15
"[R] epeated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience"
as international law "penetrates ... [local] legal system [s] ."151
Pax mercatoria, in short, becomes domesticated as part of na-
tional law. 15 2
The primary institutions of international economic law dif-
fer only in degree and. not in kind from their domestic counter-
parts. Like national courts, the WTO, the IMF, and the World
Bank "limit the flexibility of [domestic] decision makers" even
though the Bretton Woods institutions "carry no arms and hold
no independent purse strings."15 "[I] t must be in the interest of
[political] actors who establish such institutions and protect
their autonomy to abide by the limits imposed by those institu-
tions. '
Multigovernmental institutions face many of the constraints
147. Id.
148. Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International
Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (2000).
149. Phillips, supra note 70, at A21. On the use of the "Brady bond" mechanism to
collateralize Third World debt with U.S. Treasury notes, see John E. Rodgers &
Jonathan R. Hodes, Using the "Brady Bond" Approach in Mexican Corporate Financing, 2
MEX. TRADE & L. RVrR. 5 (1990); Ruth Rosauer, Emerging Market Debt Instruments Play
Siren Song for Pension Plans, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 211, 216-17 (1998).
150. Simmons, supra note 148, at 360.
151. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2603 (1997).
152. Cf Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. Rv. 31
(1996) (reconciling federal Indian law with international law of nations).
153. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins ofJudicial Empowerment Through Constitutional-
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that handcuff domestic decisionmakers. Acknowledging this re-
ality all but guts the common complaint that the WTO does not
permit, much less welcome, full participation by nongovernmen-
tal organizations.' 55 Vis-A-vis domestic courts, the WTO enjoys
no greater leverage over elected lawmakers. If anything, it has
far less insofar as the WTO's only means of securing compliance
is its threat to authorize retaliatory sanctions by other nations. 156
But protest follows power uphill as surely as water flows downhill.
As "power seeps upwards" out of national governments to inter-
national organizations, "the attention of interest groups" will fol-
low. 157 Interest groups hate the WTO precisely because it is
more transparent, because the rules of free trade expose the de-
structive nature of domestic legislation effecting interest-group
transfers. 58 Granting standing to nongovernmental organiza-
tions before the WTO would gouge the public for the benefit of
"a select group of well-monied interest groups," 59 particularly
those whose "street demonstrations at the Seattle ministerial
meeting" telegraphed their belief that "the WTO has been too
successful." 6 '
IV. BY THE RVER OF SWIRLING EDDIES'6'
A. Boom Times in Bratislava
Let us return now to the Czech and Slovak Republics. The
frontier between these formerly federated nations represented a
real divide circa September 2000. In a development vastly qui-
155. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 907 (1995).
156. See GATT art. XXIII(1); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). See generally
Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules-Toward a
More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INTL L. 335 (2000).
157. Spiro, supra note 144, at 958.
158. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WI'O Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is
More, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
159. Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. 295, 319 (1996).
160. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 478, 494 (2000).
161. EzRA POUND, THE RIVER-MERCHANT'S WIFE: A LETTER, LL. 16-17 (1915) ("You
went into far Ku-to-en, by the river of swirling eddies, / And you have been gone five
months"); cf PETER GABRIEL, Washing of the Water, on Us (UNI/Geffen 1992) ("River, o
river, carry me on").
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eter than the Prague protests but ultimately more significant,
Slovakia signed an agreement on September 28, 2000, that
would enable it to become the thirtieth member of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (or
"OECD").162 Ivan Miklos, Slovakia's deputy prime minister, said
that this step toward OECD accession "signifies Slovakia's desire
and readiness to share the... market principles and democratic
orientation" embraced by the OECD and its members.
1 61
Slovakia has not enjoyed comparable success in its efforts to
join NATO and the European Union. Soon after the dissolution
of the former Czechoslovakia, Slovakia applied for membership
in NATO and the EU. 6 The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Po-
land joined the OECD between 1995 and 1996.165 In 1999, these
countries joined NATO, extending the Western military alliance
deep into the heart of the defunct Warsaw Pact.166 Slovak mem-
bership will come, if at all, in a later wave of NATO expansion
that would include Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia. The Euro-
pean Union has left Slovakia off its fastest track for membership.
The OECD has acknowledged that Slovakia is taking longer to
complete the OECD's "Partners in Transition" program for "as-
sistance ... in building the institutions and legal and regulatory
structures needed for a market economy" in central and eastern
Europe.1 67 The five-year gap between Czech and Slovak acces-
sion to the OECD suggests that Slovakia may endure as much as
a decade of delayed integration vis-a-vis its central European
neighbors." 8
This is the price that Slovakia is paying for the instability
162. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Slovakia Signs
Agreement Paving the Way for Membership of OECD (Sept. 28, 2000), at http://www.oecd.
org/media/release/slovaksigning.htm [hereinafter OECD/Slovakia].
163. Id.
164. See European Commission, Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application
for Membership of the European Union, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge
ment/slovakia/op_07_97/index.htm; Martin Fletcher & Michael Evans, Aspiring Mem-
bers Urged to Show Patience, TIMES LONDON, Jan. 6, 1994.
165. See Jane Perlez, Poland Joining O.E. C.D.: A Step Further into Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 1996, at D3.
166. SeeJane Perlez, Poland, Hungary and the Czechs Join NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1999, at Al; see also Craig R. Whitney, Three Former Members of Eastern Bloc Invited into
NATO, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at Al.
167. OECD/Slovakia, supra note 162.
168. See Edmund L. Andrews, European Union's Tough but Relentless Drive to Expand,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1999, at C22.
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that marred the earliest stages of its independence. "[C]rony
politics" in the new republic's first years made Slovakia "a pariah
left out of the first round of NATO expansion and shunned for
entry negotiations by the European Union. ' 169 Although the
"rapidity with which [Eastern Europe's] Communist regimes had
fallen [in 1989] was an indication of fundamental and wide-
spread opposition to the Communist system," no "consensus
[emerged] on what should replace it." T1 70 The former Czechoslo-
vakia disintegrated on January 1, 1993, largely because of the po-
litical ambitions of one Czech and one Slovak. Vladimfr Me6iar
wanted to be the founder of an independent Slovak state; Vdiclav
Klaus, the Czech economist-turned-prime minister, seized the
opportunity to rid the former federation of its poorer Slovak ter-
ritories. As a result, Czechoslovakia broke in two even though
neither the Czech nor the Slovak population had a chance to
vote directly on the issue. 17
1
To this day, one potential source of danger lurks in the leg-
acy of central planning. A growing gap between public and pri-
vate sector wages in the transitional economies of central and
eastern Europe may compromise these governments' ability to
attract new talent, retain skilled employees, and combat corrup-
tion. 172 In Slovakia as in the rest of the world, "it is not the mere
rise in per capita income ... that is Of greatest importance, but
rather the changes in the class and social structure caused by
industrialization and urbanization which are most consequential
for democracy." 173
By September 2000, though, more than the proverbial seven
years had passed since the Velvet Divorce of 1993. Wireless
phones ruled Slovak airwaves, and superstores across Slovakia
stocked consumer goods whose variety and abundance were un-
169. Steven Erlanger, Arrest May End Slovakia Ex-Premier's Influence, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 2000, at A6.
170. STANISiAvJ. KIRSCHBAUM, A HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUR-
VIVAL 251 (1995).
171. See id. at 268-71.
172. See Vera A. Adamchik & Arjun S. Bedi, Wage Differentials Between the Public and
the Private Sectors: Evidence from an Economy in Transition, 7 LABOUR ECON. 203 (2000)
(deriving these conclusions from a study of Poland).
173. Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschmeyer & John D. Stephens, The Impact of Eco-
nomic Development on Democracy, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 85 (1993). See generally DIETRICH
RUESCHMEYER, EVELYNE HUBER STEPHENS &JOHN D. STEPHENS, CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
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thinkable even one, decade before.174 On what seemed like
every corner in Nitra, the same sign suggested that the old
dream of multiethnic Mitteleuropa (or stredaevropa, if you prefer
the Slovak to the German) had been reborn with a slightly differ-
ent accent-privdtna jazykovd skola.175 In Kogice, U.S. Steel's
US$450 million acquisition of the VSZ steel mill may prove "cru-
cial to re-establishing Slovakia's credibility with the West and re-
pairing a national image damaged by corruption and crony capi-
talism. 1 76 With OECD membership virtually in hand, Slovak ac-
cession to the European Union and full membership within the
ranks of developed nations suddenly loomed, not as remote pos-
sibilities, but rather as distinct probabilities. Suffice it to say that
Slovakia in September 2000 was easing toward pax mercatoria.
B. Never Before Have So Many Been So Wrong About So Much
The antiglobalization movement has made some extraordi-
nary claims. Let us transplant a precept of natural science into
this social realm:177 extraordinary claims demand extraordinary
proof.1 78 From Seattle to Prague, protesters have argued that
the organs of international economic law conspire with multina-
tional corporations to sap national and local governments of le-
gitimate power, to destabilize global security, and to poison
workplaces as well as ecosystems.1 79 That case has not met even
the most generous standard of proof. The antiglobalization
movement has failed to refute the following:
Dramatic improvements in welfare at every wealth and income
174, Cf John H. Barton &John S. Fisher, Traditional Trade Theory and Its Limita-
tions, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 5, 15 (1982) (observing that free trade
typically enhances diversity and consumer choice).
175. Private language school.
176. Edmund L. Andrews, Steel City, Slovakia: An American Giant Places a Bet in East-
ern Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at Cl.
177. But cf Robert Wolf, The Regionalist Answer, 9 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 610
(2000) (protesting, from an antiglobalist perspective, that "[r]elating a possibility in
human history to a fact of natural history is a mistake").
178. See Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 7 (2d ed.
1970).
179. See generally GLOBALIZE THIS! THE BATTLE AGAINST THE WORLD TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION AND CORPORATE RULE (Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach eds., 2000) [hereinaf-
ter GLOBALIZE THIS!] (collecting antiglobalist essays on the significance of the Seattle
riots).
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level.18 Since 1820 global wealth has expanded tenfold, thanks
largely to technological advances and the erosion of barriers to
trade.18 ' The world economic order, simply put, is lifting people
out of poverty. According to the World Bank, the percentage of
the world's population living in extreme poverty fell from 28.3 to
23.4% between 1987 and 1998.182 (The World Bank defines ex-
treme and absolute poverty according to "reference lines set at
$1 and $2 per day" in 1993 terms, adjusted for "the relative
purchasing power of currencies across countries.") 8 3 A more
optimistic study has concluded that "the share of the world's
population earning less than US$2 per day shrank by more than
half" between 1980 and 1990, "from 34 to 16.6 percent. "184 In
concrete terms, "economic growth associated with globalization"
over the course of that decade helped lift 1.4 billion people out
of absolute poverty. 185 Whatever its precise magnitude, this im-
provement in global welfare has taken place because of, not in
spite of, flourishing world trade. 8 6
The meaning of American victory in the Cold War. The liberal
democracies of the north Atlantic alliance decisively defeated
their primary political rivals in the Eastern bloc. Capitalism cou-
pled with generous civil liberties crushed, central planning cou-
pled with dictatorship of the proletariat. "America, so the world
supposes, won the Cold War.' 8 7 And the world is right.
The true nature of the environmental crisis. The most serious
environmental problems involve "the depletion and destruction
of the global commons."' 8 Climate change, ozone depletion,
180. See generally ROBERT W. FOGEL, THE FOURTH GREAT AWAKENING AND THE Fu-
TURE OF EGALITARIANISM (2000).
181. See ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 1820-1992 (1995);
Deirdre McCloskey, Thomas L. Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
Globalization, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 121, 130-31 (2000) (book review).
182. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES 36 (2001) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS].
183. World Bank, Measuring Poverty, at http://www.worldbank.org/pover'ty/mis-
sion/up2.htm [hereinafter Measuring Poverty]. See generally Amartya K. Sen, Poverty: An
Ordinal Approach to Measurement, 44 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1976) (defining poverty, ine-
quality, and welfare and distinguishing these three concepts from each other).
184. KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER, supra note 129, at 8.
185. Id. at 1.
186. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 182, at 1, 17.
187. Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REv. 809, 809 (1995).
188. Chen, supra note 17, at 186.
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and the loss of species, habitats, and biodiversity are today's top
environmental priorities."'s None can be solved without sub-
stantial economic development and intense international coop-
eration. The systematic degradation of the biosphere respects
no political boundaries. Worse, it is exacerbated by poverty. Of
the myriad environmental problems in this mutually dependent
world, "persistent poverty may turn out to be the most aggravat-
ing and destructive."190 We must remember "above all else" that
"human degradation and deprivation.., constitute the greatest
threat not only to national, regional, and world security, but to
essential life-supporting ecological systems.""1 1
The enhancement of individual liberty through globalization. By
dislodging local tyrants and ideologies, globalization has mini-
mized the sort of personal abuse that too often seems endemic
to one place, one population. 192 The twenty-first century will wit-
ness "people voting with their feet to escape from some village
elder's idea of how to live, or some London School of Econom-
ics graduate's idea of protecting Indian folkways." ' This chang-
ing social reality will undermine the conventional assumption
that capital is mobile but labor is immobile. Generations of
scholarship on trade and international relations hang in the bal-
ance. At the very least we will have to recalibrate existing race-to-
the-bottom models and their sensitivity to "giant sucking
sounds."
189. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., REDUCING
RisKw SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 13 (1990);
cf ESA Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Envi-
ronment and Public Works Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1981) (quoting Edward 0.
Wilson for the proposition that "the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruc-
tion of natural habitats" is probably the contemporary crisis whose mismanagement
"our descendants [will] most regret" and "are least likely to forgive"); E.O. WILSON, THE
DIVERSITY OF LIFE 254 (1992) ("I cannot imagine a scientific problem of greater imme-
diate importance for humanity [than the destruction of biodiversity].").
190. Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing Countries?,
23 ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993).
191. James A. Lee, Conservation in a World in Search of a Future, in CONSERVATION
FOR THE TwEN-IY-FimsT CENTURY 284, 287 (David Western & Mary C. Pearl eds., 1989).
192. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54, 60-61 (James Madison) (Edward Meade
Earle ed., 1937) (urging the creation of a large republic as a public-regarding counter-
weight to self-serving "faction [s]").
193. McCloskey, supra note 181, at 132; cf Chen, supra note 17, at 172 ("[I]n
America, it is the losers who stay put, who never leave their hometowns in pursuit of
education, adventure or opportunity." (emphasis in original)).
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Nor has localism propounded plausible solutions to chal-
lenges such as food security, 1 94 AIDS and other epidemiological
crises, and barriers to full equality for women and children.'95
The localist package of autarky, retaliatory protectionism, and
isolationism would be catastrophic. It really is a shame that
Ralph Nader will probably not be named "the first U.S. ambassa-
dor to North Korea," where he could "get a real taste of what a
country that actually follows [his] insane economic philosophy-
high protectionism, economic autarky, anti-markets, antiglobal-
ization, anti-multinationals-is like for the people. who live
there."'9 6 The policies preferred by the protesters at Seattle and
Prague guarantee penury for most, security for some, and power
for an unjustly privileged few. That way runs anew the road to
serfdom.
19 7
One last aspect of the antiglobalization narrative deserves
mention. The protest movement's plea for a return to strict lo-
calism cannot be taken at face value. If restoring local sover-
eignty and ensuring accountability to geographically defined po-
litical communities were the primary objectives of the antiglobal-
ization movement, we would be witnessing a wholesale rejection
of international law. Human rights law, United Nations
peacekeeping, and ambitious multilateral environmental agree-
ments such as the Montreal Protocol,'9 8 the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity,'99 and the Kyoto Protocol 20 would draw vehe-
ment protests as infringements on national sovereignty. The
194. See C. Ford Runge & Benjamin Senauer, A Removable Feast, FOREIGN AFF., Apr.
2000, at 39, 41 (2000) ("[T]he hard truth is that developing countries need freer trade
to feed themselves.").
195. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GOAR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
34/830 (1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. GOAR, 44th sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/49/736, 28 I.L.M. 1448
(1989).
196. Thomas L. Friedman, Original Sin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A33.
197. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1994).
198. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pol-
lution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Trans-
boundary Fluxes, 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989), entered into force, Feb. 14, 1991; see also Helsinki
Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 28 I.L.M. 1335 (1989).
199. 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
200. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Dec. 10, 1997); see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), entered into force, Mar, 21, 1994.
PAX MERCATORIA
United Nations' Millenium Declaration,2 °1 issued during the
summer of 2000, would have drawn localist protesters from
around the world, and Manhattan's East Side would have resem-
bled the set of "Escape from New York."
In an ironic reversal of the familiar progressive slogan, the
antiglobalization movement thinks locally and acts globally.
Much of the protest against globalization treats the WTO, the
IMF, and the World Bank as proxies for complaints over "the
direction of national government policies," especially those af-
fecting labor and employment in the developed world.20 2 AsJus-
tice Harry Blackmun said in a completely different context, the
localist complaint "reeks of wages. '"203
Despite their impressive magnitude, gains from globaliza-
tion attract scant scholarly notice and even less popular atten-
tion. Globalization's benefits are distributed among too many
people and across too much geographic space to compete for
attention in an affluent but self-absorbed First World.20 4 Why
indeed were the demonstrators who swamped the WTO in Seat-
tle "overwhelmingly Anglo?" 20 5 By contrast, real and imagined
job losses from globalization easily captivate a First World popu-
lace that sympathizes much more readily with relatively wealthy,
media-savvy First World workers than with any group in develop-
ing or formerly socialist countries. "If patriotism is . . . the last
refuge of the scoundrel, wrapping outdated industry in the man-
tle of national interest is the last refuge of the economically dis-
possessed."20 ' And given the human propensity to notice strife
over serenity, it hardly surprises that one bad week in Seattle has
overshadowed half a century of earnest work toward pax mer-
201. See In Statement by the U.N.: The Need for Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at
A4 (resolving to halve by 2015 the populations "whose income is less than $1," who
"suffer from hunger," and "who are unable to reach, or to afford, safe drinking water").
202. Cf Barbara Crossette, Globalization Tops 3-Day U.N. Agenda for World Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, § 1, at 1 (quoting Malloch Brown of United Nations Develop-
ment Program).
203. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 619 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORs: A THEORY OF POLITI-
CAL MARMTS 101-02 (1981) (describing the wealth transfers that government can be
expected to effect whenever benefits are concentrated and costs are distributed).
205. Elizabeth (Betita) Martinez, Where Was the Color in Seattle? Looking for Reasons
Why the Great Battle Was So White, in GLOBALIZE THiS!, supra note 179, at 74.
206. KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES 62 (1995).
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catoria. "To attain any genuine measure of social justice on a
global scale, we must eliminate First World localism. '20 7 We
must fight it in the hills, we must fight it in the streets, we must
fight it even in the law reviews.
C. Peace for Our Time (Reprise)
Globalization is "the particularization of the universal and
the universalization of the particular."20 8 Let us bid farewell to
Neville Chamberlain, the singular but timeless politician whose
misplaced sense of pacifism inspired this Essay's title. By yield-
ing to Hitler's demands at Munich, Chamberlain earned perma-
nent disdain as the architect of appeasement. He did not, as he
had fervently hoped, "come back from Germany to Downing
Street ... with honour. 20 9
In a broader historical sense, however, his declaration of
"peace for our time" should rank a remote second in notoriety
to another of his pronouncements preceding the annexation of
Czechoslovakia. In his radio broadcast to the British people
three nights before the announcement of the Mfinchner Diktat,
Chamberlain declared it "horrible, fantastic, incredible" that the
Western powers "should be digging trenches . . .because of a
quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know
nothing. '21 0 He thereupon erected the ultimate rhetorical mon-
ument to isolationism. The next six years of world war sacrificed
millions upon that altar.211
To this horror the international community has solemnly
responded, "Never again." Absent pax mercatoria, how credible is
that pledge? In its place, what does the antiglobalization realisti-
cally propose?
207. Chen, supra note 18, at 11.
208. ROLAND ROBERSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE
177-78 (1992); accord Fredric Jameson, Preface, in THE CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION, at
xi, xi (Fredric Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1992).
209. Chamberlain, supra note 15, at 169.
210. JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETr, MUNICH: PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY 151-52 (1948)
(quoting the Prime Minister's radio address).
211. In fairness to Chamberlain, there is a respectable argument that the year he
bought at Munich proved indispensable in enabling Britain to prepare adequately for
war against Germany. See C.B. PYPER, CHAMBERLAIN AND HIS CRITICS: A STATESMAN VIN-
DICATED 78-79 (1962). The military merits of appeasement aside, the bitter irony in the
description of the events at Munich as "peace for our time" secures Chamberlain's
place in contemporary rhetoric.
PAX MERCATORIA
The protesters quit have Prague. Let us return. Look back
on the river, now that the IMF, the World Bank, and their antag-
onists evacuated the Czech capital. "[T]he Vltava ha[s] already
flowed through the city, leaving behind the glory of the Castle
and churches; like an actress after a performance, it [is] tired
and contemplative; it flow[s] on between its dirty banks,
bounded by walls and fences that themselves bounded factories
and abandoned playgrounds. '21 2 Little do passersby "care that a
river flow[s] from century to century through their ephemeral
city. '"213 "[T]he sight of the [Vltava's] flow [is] soothing and
healing. The river flow[s] from century to century, and human
affairs play themselves out on its banks. Play themselves to be
forgotten the next day, while the river flows on.
2 14
"[H]umankind, in the aftermath of two world wars, has
reached a turning point in its history .... a new era of global
interdependence .... 215 No man, no woman, no child, no na-
tion is an island. "For you, too, feed the River timelessly. / And
few evade full measure of their fate .. "216
212. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 171 (Michael Henry
Heim trans., Faber & Faber 1984).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 170.
215. Berman, supra note 76, at 1621.
216. HART CRANE, THE BRIDGE: A POEM 20 (Waldo Frank & Thomas A. Vogler
eds., Liveright 1970) (1933).
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